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ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BEYOND COMPLIANCE: EXTERNALITIES
AND ACCOUNTING
Arthur J. Jacobson*

The title of this paper really poses a question: Should corpora
tions try to do more for the environment than the legal system re
quires? If so, what are corporations best equipped to do?
The answers to either question are by no means obvious. The
reason the answers are not obvious stems from the nature of the envi
ronmental problem. The environmental problem is above all the
problem of externalities.
In a decentralized economy, where all costs of activities appear
as real costs to economic actors, there would be no environmental
problem. We could quibble about the meaning of cost, but in princi
ple this statement is correct. The pricing mechanism in such an econ
omy would provide as much information as any economic actor
needs, without reference to the environment. The only issue in such
an economy is whether economic actors have sufficiently accurate cost
accounting systems to successfully take account of all real costs. If
laws and legal enforcement mercilessly relate costs back to the genera
tors of the costs, whether through private damage actions, or through
administrative or criminal enforcement actions, then the economic ac
tors would have ample incentive to develop adequate accounting
systems.
The reason we have an environmental problem is that many costs
of activities do not show up as real costs to economic actors. Laws
and legal enforcement do not adequately relate costs back to the gen
erators of the costs. Economic actors do not have adequate incentives
for developing accounting systems that capture all real costs.
The environmental problem thus has two components. First, law
and legal enforcement must relate costs back to the generators of the
costs. Second, cost accounting systems must provide information
about the costs to the generators.
The question posed by this paper necessarily assumes a failure in
one or both of these components. Corporate action "beyond compli
ance" assumes either that the law or legal enforcement does not relate
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costs back to the generators of the costs, or that cost accounting sys
tems fail to provide accurate information about the costs to the
generators.
As to the first possible failure—a failure of law or legal enforce
ment—there are two conceptual difficulties in urging corporate action
"beyond compliance."
First, to the degree that the failure of law or legal enforcement is
a result of pohtical, not technical, factors, it is unclear what special
ethical mandate corporate managers have to spend corporate funds in
excess of the requirements imposed by the open and free operation of
democratic government. Nothing in corporate law especially prohib
its such private ethical action. We have a long tradition of corporate
charity' and the ALI guidelines now specifically protect some profitthreatening ethical decisions.^ But it is equally true that nothing in
corporate law especially recommends private ethical action. The
premise of grassroots movements such as the Valdez Principles^ and
1 See. e.g.. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 161, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (finding
that a corporate contribution to a university in support of research "was a lawful exercise of
the corporation's implied and incidental powers under common-law principles and that it
came within the express authority of the pertinent state legislation"), appeal dismissed, 346
U.S. 861 (1953); Garrett, Corporate Donations, 22 Bus. LAW. 297, 301 (1967) ("Donations
should be reasonable in amount. . ., bear some reasonable relation to the corporation's inter
est, and not be so 'remote and fanciful' as to excite the opposition of shareholders whose
property is being used."). But see Prunty, Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV.
467 (1960) ("The conversion of a business corporation into an eleemosynary institution would
still be improper, as would be the giving away of all or a substantial part of the corporate assets
or a constant unbalanced feeding of a 'pet' charity, without regard for the corporate welfare.").
2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
3 The pension funds of New York City and California and other investors joined
with environmental groups and religious organizations ... to introduce a code of
conduct to judge which corporations are environmentally responsible. . . .
The 10-point code has been named the Valdez Principles, recalling the disas
trous oil spill by the Exxon Valdez oil tanker off the Alaska coast. It calls on
companies to address the effect of both product and production processes on em
ployees, communities and the environment. It also includes requirements that
companies appoint environmental experts to their boards and conduct and publi
cize an annual audit of their compliance with the code.
The code was drawn up by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies. Its backers include the Social Investment Forum, which represents
325 fund managers and investment advisors, . . . and the National Council of
Churches' Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility.
. . .[T]he National Audubon Society [is] one of 14 environmental groups backing
the effort.
Feder, Group Sets Corporate Code on Environmental Conduct, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1989, at
Dl, col. 1.
The Valdez Principles are set forth in Sand & van Buren, Environmental Disclosure and
Performance: The Benefits of Standardization, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1347, 1348 n.4 (1991).
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Green Seal Inc.'' is failure of the democratic political system. These
niovements must be able to defend the proposition that private inter
est group activities amounting to boycott are democratically and ethi
cally superior to the normal channels of political action. This is not at
all obvious.
Second, to the degree that corporate practice sets a standard for
compliance in civil actions, private ethical action, if generalized, inevi
tably raises the standard. What was once private ethical action would
then inexorably become the legal standard. What a corporation may
be willing to do from ethical motivations, it may not wish to be legally
forced to do. After all, an ethical corporation gets collateral benefits
from ethical action—public relations, employee morale, and so
forth—which it does not get from mere compliance. Furthermore,
corporations would have no guarantee that ethical imperatives would
be satisfied once the old level of ethical action (that is, action once
considered "beyond compliance") becomes incorporated in legal stan
dards (that is, action considered mere compliance). Ethical forces
have their own, self-interested reasons for staying in business. Corpo
rations would thus be facing an endless ethical escalator. They might
rationally choose not to get on in the first place.
As to the second failure—a failure of cost accounting systems to
provide accurate information to cost generators about externalities—
the accounting profession remains, I believe, totally unfit to even be
gin redressing the failure. We still depend, for the most part, on the
victims of externalities to do the accounting for cost generators, and
victims will do the accounting only when the legal system gives them
the incentive to do so: a legal claim. Take the struggle over alterna
tive energy sources. Do we have any environmental accounting sys
tem for telling whether coal is superior to nuclear power? I consider
the lack of an adequate system for economic actors to account for
externalities to be the chief obstacle to making rational decisions
about environmental cost-saving measures beyond compliance.'
Even assuming a solution to these two problems, I believe that no
one has successfully solved the corporate management problem of
^ Green Seal Inc., a private, nonprofit concern, plans to have panels certify products that
reduce waste and pollution or promote recycling. Meier, It's Green and Growing Fast, But Is It
Good for the Earth?, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1990, at 48, col. 4. Green Seal and a similar, forprofit organization. Scientific Certification Systems, Inc., are modelled on government panels
in Germany, Canada and Japan. Id.
5 The Pace University Center for Environmental Legal Studies recently published a pio
neering study of the environmental effects of generating electricity. See R. OTTINGER, D.
Wcx)LEY, N. ROBINSON, D. HODAS & S BABE, ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY
(1990). The Pace team wrestles with the economic problems inherent in measuring environ
mental costs and benefits. The project bristles with difficulties. Nevertheless, by taking con-
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weaving environmental decision making into ordinary managerial and
budgeting decisions. Frank Friedman addresses this problem in his
paper,® but I have yet to be convinced that any solution is possible. If
a corporation disperses environmental decision making to divisions,
then environmental considerations will always lose out to the need to
show a profit. If, on the other hand, the corporation unifies environ
mental decision making at the corporate level, then divisions will in
evitably frustrate the efforts of the central environmental decision
maker to gather relevant information.
Despite all these difficulties, I believe, nonetheless, that corpora
tions have an authentic role to play in environmental protection be
yond compliance. It seems to me that corporations can provide
organizational facilities to employees, and possibly even to communi
ties. A trivial, but potentially important, example is car pooling.
American government is always best when it plays the role of provid
ing facilities to the economy. Corporations—as private sector "gov
ernments"—also have a role in providing these cost-saving facilities.
Nevertheless, a caveat is still in order. Inasmuch as corporations as
sume the costs of these facilities, the economic incentives to their
users can easily distort the efficient allocation of resources. If corpo
rations do not "pass on" these costs, then inefficient overuse of the
facilities they provide is inevitable.
troversial positions, the Pace team has performed an invaluable service for future workers in
the field.
For cvample, the Pace study assumes that costs and benefits must be regarded as such by
some human actor. Id. at 54. The study disregards costs or benefits to non-humans. This is
an ethically and economically controversial position.
The Pace study does not pursue the problem of environmental accounting, since its au
thors maintain that environmental costs appear only as social costs, those which the account
ing systems of individual economic actors do not "internalize." Id. at 62-63. Since individual
economic actors fail to account for environmental costs, it is difficult to see how the political
system can rationally assess them. Judging what economic actors would be willing to pay to
avoid such costs must be hypothetical—i.e., intolerably value-laden from a rigorous economic
perspective.
From a theoretical perspective, the real solution to the environmental problem seems to
be assigning liabilities and constructing accounting systems to force economic actors to inter
nalize all costs associated with their activities. From this perspective, "environmental account
ing" is an oxymoron.
Economists, to their credit, have begun to address the need to account for traditionally
undervalued environmental resources. See Passell, Rebel Economists Add Ecological Cost to
Price of Progress, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at CI, col. 5. The New York Times article
reports that the United Nations Statistical Office is working on a general framework for envi
ronment and natural resource accounting.
® See Friedman, Environmental Management for the Future—Environmental Auditing Is
Not Enough, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (1991).

